12 ideas
| 17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
| 17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
| 8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
| 8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
| 8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |