Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemology', 'The Intentionality of Sensation' and 'Presentism and Properties'

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8 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7439 The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14409 I am a presentist, and all language and common sense supports my view [Bigelow]