22 ideas
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |