Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions', 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement' and 'The Right and the Good'

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67 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]