163 ideas
| 2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
| 6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
| 2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
| 9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
| 23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
| 23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
| 14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
| 6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
| 23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
| 23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
| 23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
| 10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
| 7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
| 7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
| 23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
| 11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
| 18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
| 13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
| 18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
| 10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
| 23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
| 7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
| 23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
| 7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
| 9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
| 15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
| 19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
| 18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
| 18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
| 18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
| 23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
| 21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
| 22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
| 21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
| 22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
| 7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
| 14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
| 14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
| 14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| 14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
| 6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
| 14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
| 23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
| 23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
| 11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
| 23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
| 23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
| 7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
| 14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
| 14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
| 14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
| 14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 7906 | When the Buddha reached the highest level of insight, he could detect no self in the world [Ashvaghosha] |
| 23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
| 14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
| 7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
| 8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
| 7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
| 23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
| 23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
| 23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
| 2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 7905 | The Buddha sought ultimate reality and the final goal of existence in his meditations [Ashvaghosha] |
| 7904 | The first stage of trance is calm amidst applied and discursive thinking [Ashvaghosha] |