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All the ideas for 'Physics', 'De Corpore (Elements, First Section)' and 'Causal Connections'

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135 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes]
If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes]
If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes]
If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]