73 ideas
| 6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
| 6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| 12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
| 15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| 17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| 9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| 16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| 15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| 15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
| 15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
| 15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
| 8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
| 8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
| 7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| 8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
| 12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| 17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| 15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
| 15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
| 15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
| 15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
| 15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
| 15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
| 15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
| 4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| 15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
| 3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
| 3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
| 6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
| 6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
| 6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
| 6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
| 6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
| 6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |