166 ideas
3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
5082 | Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle] |
3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle] |
9790 | Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle] |
22962 | Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle] |
18090 | Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle] |
22929 | Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
22930 | Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
18833 | A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle] |
9974 | Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle] |
5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle] |
16115 | Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle] |
22960 | The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle] |
17262 | Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder] |
16656 | The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle] |
16644 | The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle] |
5117 | Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle] |
17041 | Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle] |
16172 | Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle] |
16623 | We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle] |
16174 | A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle] |
17043 | Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle] |
16970 | A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle] |
16104 | Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle] |
11255 | In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis] |
9071 | We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle] |
16791 | There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle] |
16972 | The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
5084 | A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle] |
16173 | Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle] |
17042 | Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle] |
16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
16574 | Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle] |
11254 | Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13110 | Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle] |
13108 | Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle] |
13106 | Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle] |
3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
8331 | To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle] |
5080 | We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle] |
16969 | Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle] |
11250 | Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12045 | Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas] |
16968 | There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle] |
13109 | Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle] |
3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
9789 | You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle] |
9788 | Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle] |
5107 | Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle] |
20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
5111 | All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle] |
3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
5092 | Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle] |
5113 | Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle] |
5085 | 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle] |
5089 | Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle] |
5086 | The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle] |
5087 | A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle] |
5091 | Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle] |
5108 | Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle] |
5093 | Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle] |
5095 | The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle] |
16762 | Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle] |
17464 | When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle] |
11252 | The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11253 | A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis] |
13107 | Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle] |
8332 | The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle] |
9787 | Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle] |
20063 | Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle] |
5114 | If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle] |
5116 | When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle] |
5099 | The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle] |
5097 | If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle] |
5098 | Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle] |
20920 | If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle] |
5106 | Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle] |
22967 | It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle] |
8590 | Time does not exist without change [Aristotle] |
22965 | Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle] |
22885 | For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon] |
22959 | Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle] |
22964 | Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle] |
5104 | Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle] |
22956 | How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle] |
5102 | If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle] |
5103 | Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle] |
22961 | The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle] |
22916 | Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
16693 | Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle] |
22958 | Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle] |
22968 | Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle] |
22963 | We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle] |
22966 | The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle] |
22957 | We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle] |
5083 | Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle] |
5119 | The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle] |
16006 | Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard] |
3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
7577 | Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard] |
20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |