Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Theaetetus' and 'Truth and Truthmakers'

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89 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle, by Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing [Aristotle, by Urmson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality [Aristotle, by O'Grady]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties [Aristotle, by Kung]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The concepts of gods arose from observing the soul, and the cosmos [Aristotle, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]