Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Physics', 'Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper' and 'Meditations'

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213 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M]
Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]