555 ideas
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
| 16137 | Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M] |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
| 5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
| 21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
| 7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
| 21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
| 16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
| 5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
| 21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
| 21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
| 9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
| 12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
| 18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
| 9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
| 5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
| 5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
| 5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
| 5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
| 5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
| 5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
| 5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
| 5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
| 21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
| 5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
| 18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 623 | It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience [Aristotle] |
| 5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
| 5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
| 11282 | Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 6561 | A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time) [Aristotle] |
| 1601 | The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time [Aristotle] |
| 11281 | We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man [Aristotle] |
| 1602 | For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential [Roochnik on Aristotle] |
| 608 | There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety [Aristotle] |
| 627 | If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites? [Aristotle] |
| 628 | Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter? [Aristotle] |
| 5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
| 10953 | The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity [Aristotle] |
| 10957 | The material element may be essential to a definition [Aristotle] |
| 10960 | If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity? [Aristotle] |
| 5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
| 16094 | You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised [Aristotle] |
| 596 | Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle] |
| 16107 | Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle] |
| 12360 | Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 10944 | A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle] |
| 12355 | 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner [Aristotle] |
| 12352 | Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white [Aristotle] |
| 11383 | A definition is of the universal and of the kind [Aristotle] |
| 10961 | Definition by division is into genus and differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12356 | If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 17040 | If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too [Aristotle] |
| 12353 | Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12081 | Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11153 | A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 12080 | Essence is not all the necessary properties, since these extend beyond the definition [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
| 22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
| 5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
| 23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
| 15770 | Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given [Aristotle] |
| 5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
| 574 | Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle] |
| 10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
| 10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
| 10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
| 575 | If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle] |
| 15775 | Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle] |
| 10915 | The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that [Aristotle] |
| 5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
| 586 | Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle] |
| 19165 | Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson] |
| 562 | Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth? [Aristotle] |
| 573 | The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
| 18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
| 22154 | For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter] |
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 11264 | Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11258 | We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty [Aristotle] |
| 11265 | Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11262 | Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11263 | Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11266 | Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11270 | Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11267 | Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11268 | Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11269 | Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11271 | Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11272 | Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11273 | Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11274 | Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11276 | Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11275 | Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
| 560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
| 9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
| 8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
| 16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
| 8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
| 13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
| 12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
| 17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
| 17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
| 17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
| 646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
| 9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
| 3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
| 17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
| 17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
| 17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
| 9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
| 13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
| 12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
| 12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
| 2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
| 12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
| 15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
| 611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| 11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
| 16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
| 12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
| 10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
| 16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
| 11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
| 16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
| 15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
| 7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
| 19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
| 21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
| 5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
| 6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
| 12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
| 7935 | There cannot be uninstantiated properties [Aristotle, by Macdonald,C] |
| 16161 | Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 15109 | The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17849 | For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect [Aristotle] |
| 7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
| 10947 | Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle] |
| 10956 | If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle? [Aristotle] |
| 16113 | Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing [Aristotle] |
| 16114 | Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality') [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
| 16753 | Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle] |
| 15780 | Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical [Aristotle] |
| 11938 | The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle] |
| 15766 | Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle] |
| 15767 | Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle] |
| 17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
| 11379 | Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle] |
| 12096 | Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 649 | The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals [Aristotle] |
| 12094 | No universals exist separately from particulars [Aristotle] |
| 10948 | Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior [Aristotle] |
| 643 | How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them? [Aristotle] |
| 633 | If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them [Aristotle] |
| 16110 | If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating? [Aristotle] |
| 647 | There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular [Aristotle] |
| 9483 | Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy [Aristotle] |
| 640 | All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any [Aristotle] |
| 641 | Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things? [Aristotle] |
| 16108 | If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities [Aristotle] |
| 4470 | Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status [Aristotle, by Moreland] |
| 605 | The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement [Aristotle] |
| 645 | If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled [Aristotle] |
| 16145 | Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves [Aristotle] |
| 618 | There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement [Aristotle] |
| 642 | What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities? [Aristotle] |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| 16158 | Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16086 | Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities [Aristotle] |
| 10945 | Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle] |
| 11247 | To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation [Aristotle] |
| 12062 | Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this' [Aristotle, by Wiggins] |
| 16160 | For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16156 | Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle] |
| 16163 | Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 590 | Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations [Aristotle] |
| 603 | How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist? [Aristotle] |
| 10949 | Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing [Aristotle] |
| 17838 | Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process [Aristotle] |
| 17841 | The formal cause may be what unifies a substance [Aristotle] |
| 17840 | A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing [Aristotle] |
| 17860 | Things are unified by contact, mixture and position [Aristotle] |
| 13272 | Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 17842 | Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought [Aristotle] |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
| 12076 | Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11284 | It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 592 | The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance [Aristotle] |
| 11231 | 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 569 | If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance [Aristotle] |
| 615 | The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance [Aristotle] |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| 599 | We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances [Aristotle] |
| 16778 | Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 16084 | Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 600 | Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear [Aristotle] |
| 595 | It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle] |
| 11299 | Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle] |
| 12060 | Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle] |
| 10941 | A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle] |
| 11290 | Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle] |
| 10959 | The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle] |
| 12093 | Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12362 | A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle] |
| 607 | None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle] |
| 11233 | In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12079 | Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| 10951 | The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney' [Aristotle] |
| 16096 | Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16085 | Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality [Aristotle] |
| 11285 | The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being [Aristotle] |
| 11251 | Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12345 | In 'Metaphysics' Z substantial primacy (as form) is explanatory rather than ontological [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 16147 | In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12084 | Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16119 | Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16148 | Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16112 | A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12002 | Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 16164 | Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12071 | Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances) [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16095 | Some forms, such as the Prime Mover, are held by Aristotle to exist without matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15853 | A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle [Aristotle] |
| 16109 | Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form [Aristotle] |
| 16088 | Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12301 | Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle] |
| 16092 | In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12300 | Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 12077 | Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12103 | Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 597 | Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle] |
| 10962 | It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter' [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 16142 | A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality [Aristotle] |
| 16103 | A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 16575 | Something must pre-exist any new production [Aristotle] |
| 10942 | If you extract all features of the object, what is left over? [Aristotle] |
| 13274 | The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole [Aristotle] |
| 15852 | A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it [Aristotle] |
| 15840 | If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element? [Aristotle] |
| 16136 | A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle] |
| 12878 | Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons] |
| 11199 | Aristotelian essence underlies behaviour, or underlies definition, or is the source of existence [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
| 12304 | Aristotelian essence is retained with identity through change, and bases our scientific knowledge [Aristotle, by Copi] |
| 11294 | Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11298 | Are essences actually universals? [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12099 | Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 17846 | The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular [Aristotle] |
| 12311 | Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate [Aristotle] |
| 12069 | Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12070 | Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12088 | Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11998 | Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12083 | Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11382 | Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16097 | To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
| 10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11188 | The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11291 | A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature [Aristotle] |
| 12098 | An essence causes both its own unity and its kind [Aristotle] |
| 10964 | Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 15107 | Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 11244 | Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 16143 | It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality [Aristotle] |
| 16106 | Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle] |
| 16144 | Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle] |
| 12359 | 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 12068 | Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 16141 | In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 16508 | Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force [Aristotle] |
| 16117 | The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 12092 | Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12090 | Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| 16159 | For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11378 | How a thing is generated does not explain its essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12101 | Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 11380 | Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle] |
| 17848 | Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle] |
| 16134 | We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle] |
| 17847 | You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle] |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 12611 | Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle] |
| 17852 | A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle] |
| 5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
| 15779 | Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle] |
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| 15769 | Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle] |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| 14544 | Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle] |
| 15774 | We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle] |
| 15778 | Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle] |
| 15777 | A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 12612 | Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle] |
| 15108 | Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
| 5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
| 5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
| 22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
| 21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
| 6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
| 5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
| 5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
| 21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 583 | The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle] |
| 5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
| 7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
| 4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
| 581 | Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle] |
| 5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
| 5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
| 6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 584 | If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle] |
| 585 | If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle] |
| 576 | If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle] |
| 12309 | There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle] |
| 11386 | Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle] |
| 5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
| 11385 | Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle] |
| 11289 | Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible [Aristotle] |
| 11246 | Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11384 | We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location [Aristotle] |
| 16135 | Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences [Aristotle] |
| 16105 | We know a thing when we grasp its essence [Aristotle] |
| 11296 | The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance [Aristotle] |
| 11999 | Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
| 2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
| 9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
| 22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
| 9088 | Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things [Aristotle] |
| 16153 | Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 9791 | Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement [Aristotle] |
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| 5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
| 5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
| 571 | Is Socrates the same person when standing and when seated? [Aristotle] |
| 21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
| 5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
| 2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
| 5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
| 5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
| 9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
| 5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
| 5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
| 5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
| 5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
| 8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
| 23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
| 21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
| 19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
| 5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
| 5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
| 11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
| 5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
| 5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
| 22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
| 9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
| 9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
| 9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
| 8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
| 7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
| 20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
| 20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
| 636 | Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically [Aristotle] |
| 635 | The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement [Aristotle] |
| 5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
| 5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
| 591 | Excellence is a sort of completion [Aristotle] |
| 625 | Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both? [Aristotle] |
| 621 | Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence [Aristotle] |
| 5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
| 5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
| 6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
| 5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
| 11241 | Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct [Aristotle] |
| 632 | Why are some things destructible and others not? [Aristotle] |
| 22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
| 8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
| 626 | Everything is arranged around a single purpose [Aristotle] |
| 5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
| 17858 | Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers [Aristotle] |
| 12299 | Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter [Aristotle, by Fine,K] |
| 601 | Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites [Aristotle] |
| 10955 | Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects) [Aristotle] |
| 16590 | Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category [Aristotle] |
| 12001 | Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 12868 | Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties [Simons on Aristotle] |
| 15954 | Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable [Aristotle, by Alexander,P] |
| 16099 | The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 15771 | Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity [Aristotle] |
| 616 | It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity? [Aristotle] |
| 16098 | I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
| 10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
| 561 | Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle] |
| 14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
| 588 | We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle] |
| 5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
| 634 | Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle] |
| 9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
| 5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
| 14543 | When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle] |
| 5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
| 19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
| 17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
| 5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
| 5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
| 5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
| 5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
| 5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
| 5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
| 617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
| 620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
| 619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
| 613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
| 622 | There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle] |
| 7603 | God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K] |
| 5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
| 16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
| 5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
| 5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
| 5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
| 5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
| 8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
| 3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
| 5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
| 610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
| 12097 | There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars [Aristotle] |