77 ideas
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 12274 | Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 22366 | There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber] |
| 22367 | The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber] |
| 12260 | Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle] |
| 12291 | There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle] |
| 12292 | Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle] |
| 12272 | We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle] |
| 12279 | The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12283 | In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle] |
| 12289 | The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle] |
| 12261 | Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle] |
| 12263 | 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle] |
| 12285 | The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 11261 | Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle] |
| 12273 | Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle] |
| 12267 | There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle] |
| 12282 | An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle] |
| 12264 | An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle] |
| 12280 | Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle] |
| 13269 | In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle] |
| 12284 | Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle] |
| 12262 | An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle] |
| 12290 | Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle] |
| 12286 | If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle] |
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 12259 | Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 12271 | Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle] |
| 12293 | We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
| 12277 | Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle] |
| 12276 | Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle] |
| 12275 | We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle] |
| 12281 | Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle] |
| 12265 | All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle] |
| 12278 | 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle] |