Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Politics', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'The Wanderer and his Shadow'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


216 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]