Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Politics', 'Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Meditations'

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449 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C]
Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant]
You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant]
The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner]
Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant]
Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard]
A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin]
A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant]
Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant]
Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant]
In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant]
If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant]
Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant]
Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant]
Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant]
All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant]
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant]
Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
No a priori concept can be defined [Kant]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter]
Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant]
Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro]
Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant]
Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro]
Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert]
If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant]
Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant]
Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant]
The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley]
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie]
Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel]
Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge]
Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant]
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard]
Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant]
If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach]
Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach]
For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner]
The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard]
'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant]
We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant]
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant]
Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant]
A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley]
A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant]
One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant]
Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant]
The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge]
A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA]
Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie]
Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell]
We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant]
That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant]
That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant]
The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant]
That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant]
Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant]
7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant]
We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant]
With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J]
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant]
Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant]
Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant]
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant]
Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant]
Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant]
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant]
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard]
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant]
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant]
Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate]
Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux]
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant]
Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant]
The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard]
All human cognition is through concepts [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant]
How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant]
If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant]
Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant]
Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant]
Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux]
Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant]
Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant]
The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant]
If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant]
Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant]
You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant]
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein]
Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant]
Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]