Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Politics', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'Events and Reification'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


210 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis]
If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis]
If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis]
If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis]
For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]