Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Physics', 'The Ethics' and 'Semantic Relationism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


289 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza]
If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is its own standard [Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza]
The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza]
The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza]
We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza]
Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza]
You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza]
A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza]
Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza]
The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza]
As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza]
The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza]
'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza]
Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza]
The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza]
The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza]
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza]
Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza]
An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza]
Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza]
We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza]
We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza]
Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza]
All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza]
The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza]
Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza]
Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza]
People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza]
A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza]
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza]
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K]
God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza]
God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza]
God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza]
God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley]
God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord]
Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza]
God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord]
God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza]
Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza]
That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza]
The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza]
Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza]
Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]