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All the ideas for 'Physics', 'Cours d'Analyse' and 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)'

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323 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Opposition to reason is mad [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke]
It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke]
If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke]
Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke]
We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke]
We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke]
Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke]
Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke]
We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke]
The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke]
Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley]
You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke]
Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke]
Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke]
If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke]
Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi]
It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke]
We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke]
A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke]
The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley]
We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley]
If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke]
A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke]
Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke]
The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke]
The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke]
Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke]
We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley]
Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P]
Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke]
Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke]
In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P]
I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil]
Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke]
The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke]
Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke]
The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke]
The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke]
General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke]
'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke]
My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke]
Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke]
Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke]
Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke]
Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Nothing about me is essential [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke]
Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke]
Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke]
Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke]
Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke]
Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke]
We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke]
Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke]
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P]
An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke]