141 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 5082 | Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle] |
| 16519 | No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld] |
| 13270 | Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 9790 | Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle] |
| 22962 | Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle] |
| 18090 | Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle] |
| 22929 | Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
| 22930 | Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
| 18833 | A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle] |
| 9974 | Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle] |
| 5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle] |
| 16115 | Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle] |
| 22960 | The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle] |
| 17262 | Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 16656 | The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle] |
| 16644 | The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 5117 | Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 17041 | Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle] |
| 16172 | Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle] |
| 16623 | We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle] |
| 16174 | A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle] |
| 17043 | Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle] |
| 16970 | A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle] |
| 16104 | Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle] |
| 11255 | In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 9071 | We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle] |
| 16791 | There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle] |
| 16972 | The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
| 5084 | A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle] |
| 16173 | Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle] |
| 17042 | Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle] |
| 16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
| 16574 | Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle] |
| 11254 | Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 13110 | Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle] |
| 13106 | Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle] |
| 13108 | Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle] |
| 8331 | To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle] |
| 5080 | We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle] |
| 16969 | Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle] |
| 11250 | Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 12045 | Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| 16968 | There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle] |
| 13109 | Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle] |
| 9789 | You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle] |
| 9788 | Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 5107 | Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
| 5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
| 5111 | All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle] |
| 5092 | Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle] |
| 5113 | Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle] |
| 5085 | 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle] |
| 5089 | Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle] |
| 5086 | The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle] |
| 5087 | A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle] |
| 5091 | Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle] |
| 5108 | Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle] |
| 5095 | The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle] |
| 5093 | Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle] |
| 16762 | Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle] |
| 17464 | When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle] |
| 11252 | The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11253 | A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 13107 | Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle] |
| 8332 | The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle] |
| 9787 | Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle] |
| 20063 | Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle] |
| 5114 | If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle] |
| 5116 | When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle] |
| 5099 | The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle] |
| 5097 | If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle] |
| 5098 | Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle] |
| 20920 | If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle] |
| 5106 | Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle] |
| 22967 | It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle] |
| 8590 | Time does not exist without change [Aristotle] |
| 22965 | Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle] |
| 22885 | For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon] |
| 22959 | Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle] |
| 22964 | Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle] |
| 5104 | Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle] |
| 22956 | How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle] |
| 5102 | If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle] |
| 5103 | Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle] |
| 22961 | The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle] |
| 22916 | Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin] |
| 16693 | Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle] |
| 22958 | Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle] |
| 22968 | Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle] |
| 22963 | We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle] |
| 22966 | The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle] |
| 22957 | We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle] |
| 5083 | Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle] |
| 5119 | The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |