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All the ideas for 'Topics', 'Characteristics' and 'Against Liberalism'

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73 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]