37 ideas
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |