Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Counterparts and Identity' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]