Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority' and 'Logical Consequence'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]