Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Troubles with Functionalism' and 'Scientific Objectivity'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22353 One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
22356 An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
22359 Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
22360 The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
22362 Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
22364 Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
20768 Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22357 The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22365 The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
3049 The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3549 Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]