Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'Letter to Menoeceus'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14052 Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
20768 Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
23551 It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
23558 Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23553 Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
23550 Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
23552 We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
23555 Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
14062 Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
1837 We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
23554 Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
1836 Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
14061 Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
23557 To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14053 It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
14055 The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
14054 Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1833 Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
14057 All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
14058 Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
14063 Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
14059 The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
1835 True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
14056 We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
14060 Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
3049 The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3549 Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]