62 ideas
20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |