Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysics: an introduction' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
18859 Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
20768 Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18861 Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18866 Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18860 A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18863 What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
18865 Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18862 Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
3049 The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3549 Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]