102 ideas
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| 20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1618 | We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 1611 | Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine] |
| 1613 | Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine] |
| 1616 | Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine] |
| 1615 | Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine] |
| 1614 | Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine] |
| 10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
| 19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
| 12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
| 1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
| 8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
| 16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
| 7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
| 1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
| 15402 | There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine] |
| 4443 | Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 8498 | Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine] |
| 8856 | Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
| 18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| 1619 | There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine] |
| 1617 | The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine] |
| 1609 | I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine] |
| 19159 | Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| 3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| 3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |