Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reason, Truth and History' and 'Eight Theories of Ethics'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]