21 ideas
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |