21 ideas
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
20768 | Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
3049 | The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius] |
3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |