Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Theory of Objects' and 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]