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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Metaphysics of Properties' and 'To be is to be the value of a variable..'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
20768 Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
10722 Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
3049 The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3549 Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]