277 ideas
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |