69 ideas
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |