55 ideas
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
| 23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
| 23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
| 23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
| 23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
| 23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
| 23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
| 23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
| 23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
| 23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
| 23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
| 23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
| 23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
| 23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
| 23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
| 23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
| 23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
| 23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
| 23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
| 23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |