Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'Logical Investigations'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]