Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'This is Political Philosophy' and 'The Rediscovery of the Mind'

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94 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf]
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf]
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf]
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf]
Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf]
If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]