Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The View from Nowhere' and 'Just and Unjust Wars'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]