Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
13070 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11197 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11195 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
11205 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13090 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11202 It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11196 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11208 A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11198 Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
11206 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
11207 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]