Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals'

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32 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]