80 ideas
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |