12 ideas
| 19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |