92 ideas
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| 10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| 10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
| 10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
| 10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
| 10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
| 10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
| 10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
| 10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
| 10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
| 10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
| 10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
| 10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
| 10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
| 10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
| 10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
| 10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
| 10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
| 10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
| 10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
| 18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
| 18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
| 10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
| 10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
| 10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
| 10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
| 10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
| 10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
| 10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
| 10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
| 10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
| 10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
| 10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
| 10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
| 10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
| 10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
| 10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
| 10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
| 8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
| 10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
| 10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
| 10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
| 10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
| 10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
| 10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
| 10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
| 10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
| 10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
| 10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
| 10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
| 10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
| 10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
| 10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
| 10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
| 10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
| 10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
| 10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
| 10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
| 10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
| 10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
| 9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
| 10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |