69 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |