Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Material Beings' and 'Critique of Practical Reason'

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant]
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant]
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant]
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant]
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant]
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant]
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant]