12 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |