Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic''

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
23449 Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
9821 A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9585 Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
23484 Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
23494 Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
23460 To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
23451 Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
23452 Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17446 Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
9582 Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9586 In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9580 Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
9589 Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
9577 The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9578 If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9581 Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9579 Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
9587 How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9583 Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
9584 Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
23491 There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]