58 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |