49 ideas
6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |