Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modality' and 'Virtue Ethics: an Introduction'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5750 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
5737 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5744 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
5736 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
5735 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
5746 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
5738 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
5732 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5739 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
5751 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
5078 Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
5067 Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5079 Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5068 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
5076 To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
5077 The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
5065 The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
5066 If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]